Expert comment
jon.wallace
Ulrich Siegmund’s highly successful campaign points to a more durable AfD electorate and flags the tests ahead for Chancellor Merz’s government, the CDU and the federal institutions that have shaped post-war German democracy.
The Alternative for Germany (AfD)’s victory in Saxony-Anhalt’s election is a historic breakthrough and, without doubt, a turning point in German democracy. Since 1945 no party labelled extreme right has secured such a win in a state election.
The party won 43.8 per cent of the vote on 6 September, more than doubling its 2021 result. It now holds 39 of the state Landtag’s 83 seats, though this is three short of an absolute majority. The question of who will govern Magdeburg is therefore still open.
BSW, the new party of former Die Linke (‘The Left’) leader Sahra Wagenknecht, succeeded in crossing the 5 per cent threshold. Its positions on migration are not that remote from those of the AfD in some respects. Its entry into the Landtag gives it a potential role in forming a government in Saxony-Anhalt.
Beyond the political emotion, the result should be treated cautiously. Its main significance clearly lies in the way the AfD has mobilized voters and kindled a more positive political appeal. That may prove more consequential than whether the AfD manages to form a government.
That said, Saxony-Anhalt is one of Germany’s least populated states, and the AfD’s victory should therefore be considered according to the demographic scale. If not a seismic political event, it can at least be interpreted as the forewarning tremor of an approaching earthquake – if the appeal of mainstream parties keeps eroding. The CDU, Chancellor Friedrich Merz’s party, saw its share of the vote fall to 17.2 per cent.
A state shaped by decline
For its low demographics, Saxony-Anhalt is a useful laboratory to analyse the political transformation at work in Germany and Europe. Depopulation has left many smaller communities ageing and struggling to sustain local services. Saxony-Anhalt experienced a substantial decline since reunification to around 2.12 million inhabitants today. The accompanying closure of public services has reinforced residents’ belief that the region is neglected by mainstream parties.
The state has also been hit by industrial restructuring. The chemical industry is central to the region’s socioeconomic identity, but high energy costs and weak demand have heightened pressure on the sector. Pharmaceutical giant Bayer is one of the last major employers in a region whose unemployment rate stood at 8.2 per cent in August 2026, compared with 6.5 per cent nationally.
Insolvencies should not be confused with factory closures, but the figures are telling: corporate insolvency filings rose by 23.9 per cent in the state in 2025, more than twice the national increase of 10.3 per cent. The prospect of further plant closures made the future of skilled employment a sensitive political concern in the campaign.
The figures on migration present a paradox here. Saxony-Anhalt has a comparatively low foreign-national share. Approximately 7.9 per cent of the population were immigrants at the end of 2025, compared with around 14.9 per cent nationally – yet the issue has consistently topped voters’ concerns for over a decade, a paradox familiar from research on Eastern Germany.
In Saxony-Anhalt, the AfD has shaped its narratives around anxieties about public services, security and industrial decline, presenting migration as a contributing factor.
From rejection to adhesion
Analysing the rise of the National Rally (RN), French political scientists speak of the shift from a passive protest vote (‘vote de protestation’) to an active support vote (‘vote d’adhésion’).
Saxony-Anhalt suggests that such a shift has occurred. In July, 36 per cent of voters trusted the AfD most to solve the state’s problems, compared with just 9 per cent before the 2021 election. 44 per cent preferred an AfD-led government. The electorate’s motivation has clearly shifted from punishing the CDU to granting the AfD power. Why?
AfD candidate Ulrich Siegmund’s campaign adopted an upbeat, personalized style, combining large public events with a forceful social media presence. The slogan ‘Alles ist möglich’ (‘Everything is possible’) was launched in June, replacing the old negative slogan ‘enough is enough’.
This strategy paid off. Mobilization was quite exceptional. Preliminary voter-flow analysis estimates that the AfD gained 157,000 former non-voters and 83,000 former CDU voters. Digital campaigning cannot alone explain the AfD’s electoral success. But established parties showed far less inventiveness in reaching disengaged voters.
Logically, mainstream parties throughout Europe should respond by reconsidering their strategies. France’s experience with the RN shows the limits of relying on political stigma to combat the hard right. Germany’s ‘Brandmauer’ (‘firewall’) around hard right parties has also ceased to contain the AfD electorally. New thinking is needed.
Three seats short: an opportunity for the AfD?
The AfD’s near-majority may itself become a political advantage. Three additional MPs would be enough to give it an absolute majority. Siegmund can therefore pressure CDU representatives to defect to his party or vote for his election as minister-president. Even unsuccessful approaches could expose divisions within the CDU and weaken the credibility of an alternative government.
BSW has rejected joining a ‘firewall’ and expressed willingness to cooperate with the AfD on individual policies, particularly on Russia and energy. But it has ruled out electing Siegmund as minister-president.
The CDU, SPD and Greens hold only 31 seats together, rendering a majority against the AfD impossible without support from the Left Party or the BSW. But the CDU’s refusal to cooperate with either the AfD or the Left complicates this picture – and could lead to a prolonged impasse.
That could work to Siegmund’s advantage, allowing him to argue that the other parties are playing an undemocratic game by preventing the largest party from governing.
The consequences beyond Magdeburg
The AfD’s victory also piles pressure on German Chancellor Merz, whose unpopularity is already a significant problem. The state election in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern on 20 September will present another immediate test, with the AfD leading in recent polls.
A further defeat could intensify demands within the CDU for a change of strategy or even leadership. Any attempt to replace Merz as chancellor would, however, require a parliamentary majority through Germany’s constructive vote of no confidence. There is no indication at this point that the SPD, the CDU’s coalition partner, would support a move against the chancellor.
The most significant repercussion will surely be on the Bundesrat, the upper chamber of the German parliament. Saxony-Anhalt’s government has four votes in the federal chamber and could use them to oppose federal legislation, especially on state finances or administration. Four votes cannot obstruct federal bills, but they may become decisive in close motions and lend the party strategic weight.
An AfD-led state government would also amplify the party’s calls for an end to sanctions on Russia and military support for Ukraine. But it would remain very much rhetorical for now: foreign policy is a federal responsibility and the Land’s four votes would offer only limited scope for obstruction.
Saxony-Anhalt’s AfD was classified as a right-wing extremist endeavour by the state intelligence service in November 2023. That does not prohibit the party from governing. But should it take control, its implementation of its proposals concerning education, migration, policing and cultural institutions will be closely watched, particularly measures that may violate constitutional rights or federal law.
Challenges would mostly arise through Saxony-Anhalt’s constitutional court, ordinary administrative courts and, where relevant, the Federal Constitutional Court. Judicial scrutiny depends on concrete acts and the relevant procedures, not a government’s programme as such. The appointment of officials and the control of state institutions will therefore deserve as much attention as legislation itself.
Much will be written about this vote. But some perspective is important. The AfD received 576,037 second votes in a state with 1.71 million eligible voters. That is roughly 1 per cent of Germany’s 59.2 million strong electorate. The breakthrough is very localized for now.
Whether it remains so depends on how far Siegmund’s campaign recipe can be replicated – and if the AfD can now turn electoral backing into durable governing power.